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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we are presenting a new way to disable DDL statements on some specific PL/SQL 
procedures to a dba user in the Oracle database. Nowadays dba users have access to a lot of data and 
source code even if they do not have legal permissions to see or modify them. With this method we can 
disable the ability to execute DDL and DML statements on some specific pl/sql procedures from every 
Oracle database user even if it has a dba role. Oracle gives to developer the possibility to wrap the pl/sql 
procedures, functions and packages but those wrapped scripts can be unwrapped by using third party 
tools.  
The scripts that we have developed analyzes all database sessions, and if they detect a DML or a DDL 
statement from an unauthorized user to procedure, function or package which should be protected then 
the execution of the statement is denied. Furthermore, these scripts do not allow a dba user to drop or 
disable the scripts themselves. In other words by managing sessions prior to the execution of an eventual 
statement from a dba user, we can prevent the execution of eventual statements which target our scripts. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The electronic information is simpler to reuse and modify and query, so the future is going 
towards to only digital data. Sometimes, we do not need to have a trace of changes that we 
made, and sometimes it is required to know the history of changes. This information can be 
stored in any database, but not all the database engines meet these requirements. The most 
important requirements vary to performance, hardware resources, security, user-friendliness, 
price or others. 
The users, who have technical access to a lot of data, can use this information even if they do 
not have legal permissions to see or modify it. Sometimes they can benefit from these data, by 
modifying or reading it. 
Oracle database, like any other database, database administrator can grant permissions on any 
database object to a database to user, so some users have rights to insert data, some others to 
modify and some other users to modify it, but the DBA user can modify, delete, insert/create, 
update data or database objects. Securing data stored in database involves not only using strong 
password or policy, but also adequate access controls over database objects to users. 
Software developer try to make their products secure, try to hide business logic when is 
necessary by coding inside database using procedures, functions, packages, etc., and also try to 
secure the intellectual property. Oracle relational database management systems (8i, 9i, 10g and 
11i versions) have a technique to wrap PL/SQL source code with either the DBMS_DDL 
subprograms or wrap utility. 
Can we unwrap a PL/SQL source code block?  Pete Finnigan investigated the PL/SQL 
wrapping process and published the way how to unwrap a PL/SQL source code. For example 
we can try to unwrap a PL/SQL source code online at http://www.codecrete.net/UnwrapIt. 
2. ORACLE DATABASE SECURITY 
The intent of this section is to give a basic understanding of the security capabilities of Oracle 
relational database management system. It is not the scope of this paper to explain all of the 
security features and options available in Oracle relational database management system.  The 
Oracle RDMBS has too many security features which make it an excellent database system for 
any database application. Data integrity, confidentiality, and availability are well-protected with 
a properly designed Oracle database. [4] 
2.1. Authentication 
Oracle allows for various types of authentication. Oracle-based authentication allows for Oracle 
database accounts with user-ids and strong passwords which are encrypted with a modified DES 
algorithm for each database connection. Oracle passwords are stored in an encrypted format in 
the data dictionary [8]. Each session key is unique, which means the key is not re-used in any 
other session. Oracle also supports authentications based on the operating system’s user 
accounts which are then passed on to Oracle RDBMS [4].  
2.2. Profiles 
Oracle makes use of profiles to allow the database administrator to place specific restrictions, 
rules and controls on a number of system resources, password usage lifetime and various Oracle 
products. These profiles can be named, defined, and then assigned to groups of users or to 
specific users. There are two types of profiles as bellow. 
 System resource profiles:  Those profiles can be used to put user limits on certain 
system resources such as memory, CPU time, the number of data blocks that can be 
read per session, the number of concurrent active sessions, idle time, and the maximum 
connection time for a user, etc. Also, they can be used to define and enforce password 
rules such as account lockout after a number of failed login attempts, password life, etc. 
Perhaps the most impressive feature of system resources profile is the ability to have 
password complexity checked using a custom PL/SQL function. The database 
administrator/developer can write a custom code for a complex PL/SQL function to 
define how a password must be, such as number of alpha, numeric and/or numeric 
characters, minimum length, and how different a new password must be from the 
previous one.[4][6][7] 
 Product profiles: To prevent users from accessing specific commands or all commands 
in Oracle SQL, SQL/Plus, and PL/SQL. Use of this option allows the administrator to 
do such things as prevent user access to the operating system (SQL/PLUS HOST 
command), and to prevent unauthorized copying of data from one table to another 
(SQL/PLUS COPY command).[7] 
2.3. Privileges 
By default, Oracle relational database management system does not give any privileges to new 
users. New users must be given privileges before they create database connection and execute 
any database operation. Oracle users cannot do anything unless they have the specific privilege 
to do so. There are too many privileges in Oracle database management systems that can be 
given, around 100 in all. There are two different types of privileges available to be granted to 
any user. They are system and object privileges. 
System privileges allow a user to execute DDL statements to create or manipulate objects, but 
do not give access read or write to actual database objects. System privileges allow a user to 
execute different DDL commands such as ALTER, CREATE, EXECUTE ANY PROCEDURE, 
and DELETE. 
Object privileges are used to allow execute DML statements to access to some specific database 
object, such as a table or view or sequence. The database administrators can give users access to 
a chosen sub-set of columns or rows in a table, rather than the entire table.[4] Oracle also allows 
for the user of the GRANT privilege which allows a user to GRANT their privileges to another 
user or role for objects that they own as bellow.[7][9] 
2.4. Roles 
Roles are used to make easy the management process of assigning privileges to users. Roles are 
first created and then given different system and object privileges that can be assigned to users. 
Oracle database users can be given multiple roles even if they have the same privileges. It is 
much easier to create group of privileges that are organized into roles and then assign the role to 
one or more users. Roles also can be protected with passwords and the password protected roles 
require that a password be provided before activating it. The password feature is very useful in 
cases where a user needs access to data through a third party application but it is not desirable to 
give the user direct access to the data through the use of another third party tool like reporting 
tools, etc. The password can be supplied by the application, thus preventing the user to even 
need to know the password [4] [9].  
Oracle has three different default roles which have some privileges assigned. The Connect Role 
allows user login and the ability to create tables, indexes, etc. The Resource Role is very similar 
to the pervious, but allows for more advanced rights (the creation of function and triggers and 
procedures). The DBA (Database Administrator) Role is granted all system privileges needed to 
administer the database. [6] 
2.5. Protecting Data Integrity 
Oracle relational database management system provides several features to ensure data integrity 
in different cases such system failure, human error, or attacks. These features include redo log 
files, rollback segments, and LogMiner. 
All data changes are recorded in at least two redo log files that are maintained by Oracle. In the 
event of a system failure or data corruption, the last good backup and the redo log should be 
restored to bring the system back to the state it was before the corruption or data loss. 
LogMiner is a SQL-based log file analyser utility and can be used to analyze the redo log files 
and rollback segments. [9] 
3. PL/SQL SOURCE CODE BLOCKS AND WRAPPING PROCESS 
PL/SQL stands for Procedural Language/SQL. PL/SQL extends SQL by adding constructs 
found in procedural languages, resulting in a structural language that is more powerful than 
SQL. The basic unit in PL/SQL is a block. All PL/SQL programs are made up of blocks, which 
can be nested within each other. Typically, each block performs a logical action in the program. 
A block has the following structure: 
DECLARE 
  
  /* Declarative section: variables, types,  
    and local subprograms. */ 
 
BEGIN 
  
  /* Executable section: procedural and  
     SQL statements go here. */ 
 
  /* This is the only section of the block  
     that is required. */ 
 
   EXCEPTION 
 
 /* Exception handling section:  
   error handling statements go here. */ 
 
END; 
 
Only the executable section is required. The other sections are optional. The only SQL 
statements allowed in a PL/SQL program are SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE and 
several other data manipulation statements plus some transaction control. Data definition 
statements like CREATE, DROP, or ALTER are not allowed. The executable section also 
contains constructs such as assignments, branches, loops, procedure calls, and triggers, which 
are all described below (except triggers). PL/SQL is not case sensitive. C style comments (/* ... 
*/) may be used. 
A stored procedure, a function, a trigger or a package is a subroutine available to applications 
that access a relational database system. They are actually stored in the database data dictionary. 
Typical uses include data validation (integrated into the database) or access control 
mechanisms. Furthermore, they can consolidate and centralize logic that was originally 
implemented in applications. Extensive or complex processing that requires execution of several 
SQL statements is moved into Pl/SQL code blocks, and all applications call the procedures. 
Benefits from pl/sql objects (procedure, function, trigger and package) stored in database: 
 Overhead: Because stored statements are stored directly in the database, they may 
remove all or part of the compilation overhead that is typically required in situations 
where software applications send inline SQL statements to a database. In addition, 
while they avoid some overhead, pre-compiled SQL statements add to the complexity 
of creating an optimal execution plan because not all arguments of the SQL statement 
are supplied at compile time [16]. 
 Avoidance of network traffic: A major advantage with stored pl/sql object is that they 
can run directly within the database engine. In a production system, this typically means 
that the procedures run entirely on a specialized database server, which has direct access 
to the data being accessed. The benefit here is that network communication costs can be 
avoided completely. This becomes particularly important for complex series of SQL 
statements. [16] 
 Encapsulation of business logic: Database stored PL/SQL objects allows software 
developers to embed business logic in the database. This method can reduce the need to 
encode the logic elsewhere in any client applications. The database system with the help 
of stored procedures can ensure data integrity and consistency. 
 Delegation of access-rights: In many systems, stored PL/SQL objects can be granted 
access rights to the database that users who execute those procedures do not directly 
have. 
 Protection from SQL injection attacks: Database stored PL/SQL objects can be used 
to protect against injection attacks. Parameters used during function or a procedure 
execution will be treated as data even if they are inserts SQL commands from an 
attacker. 
3.1. Wrapping Process 
Wrapping is the process of hiding PL/SQL source code. Wrapping helps developers to protect 
their source code from any user who can benefit or might misuse it. Wrapping a package causes 
the code to be obfuscated, that is to say made unreadable by programmers, so that the code 
cannot be readily stolen, or looked through by hackers for weaknesses to exploit, thus protecting 
the intellectual property of the programming company. 
However wrapped packages can still be used by others such as the accounting firm, despite the 
code being unreadable, so the programming company has guarded their secrets and still enabled 
the accounting firm to use their product. 
Oracle relational database management system offers two different ways to wrap PL/SQL 
source code procedure, function or package with either the wrap utility or DBMS_DDL 
subprograms.  
Wrap utility: The wrap utility is an external application which processes an input SQL 
file which contains different statements and wraps the PL/SQL units in it, such as a 
function, procedure, package, type specification, or type body. This utility does not 
wrap PL/SQL code in anonymous blocks or triggers or DML statements. 
To run the wrap utility, the wrap command can be used via operating system prompt 
using the following syntax (with no spaces around the equal signs): 
wrap iname=input_file [ oname=output_file ] 
input_file is the name of a file containing SQL statements, that you typically run using 
SQL*Plus. If you omit the file extension, an extension of .sql is assumed. 
DBMS_DDL subprograms: The DBMS_DDL package contains procedures for 
wrapping only a single PL/SQL unit, such as a function, procedure, package, type 
specification, or type body. These overloaded subprograms provide a mechanism for 
wrapping dynamically generated PL/SQL units. The DBMS_DDL package contains 
different object like the WRAP functions and the CREATE_WRAPPED procedures. 
The CREATE_WRAPPED procedure wraps the text and creates the PL/SQL unit. 
In the following PL/SQL code is used to dynamically create and wrap a package in a 
database. 
DECLARE 
   package_text VARCHAR2(32767);  
  -- Text for creating package spec & body 
 
  -- function generate_spec generates package specification 
  FUNCTION generate_spec (pkgname VARCHAR2)  
RETURN   VARCHAR2 AS 
 
  BEGIN 
 
    RETURN 'CREATE PACKAGE ' || pkgname || ' AS 
 
      PROCEDURE raise_salary (emp_id NUMBER,  
   amount NUMBER); 
 
      PROCEDURE fire_employee (emp_id NUMBER); 
 
      END ' || pkgname || ';'; 
 
  END generate_spec; 
 
  FUNCTION generate_body (pkgname VARCHAR2)  
    RETURN VARCHAR2 AS 
  BEGIN 
 
    RETURN 'CREATE PACKAGE BODY ' || pkgname || ' AS 
      PROCEDURE raise_salary (emp_id NUMBER,  
   amount NUMBER) IS 
      BEGIN 
 
        UPDATE employees 
        SET salary = salary + amount  
              WHERE employee_id = emp_id; 
 
      END raise_salary; 
         
      PROCEDURE fire_employee (emp_id NUMBER) IS 
      BEGIN 
         
   DELETE FROM employees WHERE employee_id = emp_id; 
 
      END fire_employee; 
     
    END ' || pkgname || ';'; 
 
  END generate_body; 
 
BEGIN 
 
  -- Generate package spec 
  package_text := generate_spec('emp_actions') 
 
  -- Create wrapped package spec 
  DBMS_DDL.CREATE_WRAPPED(package_text); 
 
  -- Generate package body 
  package_text := generate_body('emp_actions'); 
 
  -- Create wrapped package body 
  DBMS_DDL.CREATE_WRAPPED(package_text); 
 
END; 
/ 
 
-- Invoke procedure from wrapped package 
CALL emp_actions.raise_salary(120, 100); 
 
When we check the static data dictionary views *_SOURCE, the source is wrapped, or hidden, 
so that others cannot view the code details. For example: 
SELECT text  
FROM USER_SOURCE  
WHERE name = 'EMP_ACTIONS'; 
 
The resulting output is similar to the following: 
TEXT 
-------------------------------------------------- 
PACKAGE emp_actions WRAPPED 
a000000 
1f 
abcd 
... 
 
Wrapped source files can be modified, copied, moved, and processed by SQL*Plus and the 
import and export utilities, but they hidden and cannot be visible through the static data 
dictionary views *_SOURCE. 
3.1.1 Limitations of Wrapping 
 Wrapping process is not recommended for hiding passwords or table names because is 
not a secure method. This process prevents most users from examining the source code 
of a PL/SQL unit, but might not stop all of them. 
 Wrapping does not hide the source code for database triggers. To prevent users from 
examining the source code workings of a trigger, a one-line trigger that invokes a 
wrapped subprogram is necessary. 
 Wrapping process does not detect syntax or semantic errors (for example, nonexistent 
tables or views) it detects only tokenization errors (for example, runaway strings). 
Syntax or semantic errors are detected during PL/SQL code compilation or during 
execution. 
 Wrapped PL/SQL units are not downward-compatible between Oracle Database 
releases they are only upward-compatible. For example, a file processed by the V8i 
wrap utility can be used into a V9i Oracle Database, but a file processed by the  V9i 
wrap utility cannot be used into a V8i Oracle Database. 
3.2 Unwrapping Process 
In old versions of Oracle we can almost easily deduce the original source code of PL/SQL 
package from the wrapped code produced. The symbol table is visible, so we can understand the 
purpose of the procedures (because we see variable names in symbol table), we can find out 
encryption algorithms that used. We also can modify the source code working straight with the 
wrapped code. 
In version 9i of Oracle almost the same information of the source code we can get in 9i 
analyzing DIANA code. 
In version 10g and 11i of Oracle Finnigan claims that unwrapping is almost the same as for 9i 
version, though some it is more difficult now because new wrap mechanism is provided, the 
symbol table is no longer visible, used base64 encryption, but IDL$ (DIANA) tables still 
contain DIANA m-code [5]. 
 
Figure 1.  PL/SQL language compilation structure. 
To unwrap a PL/SQL exist too many free tools or online websites like 
http://www.codecrete.net/UnwrapIt .  
It is beyond the scope of this paper to cover all of the unwrapping process. 
4.PROTECTING PL/SQL OBJECTS BY DISABLING DML/DDL 
STATEMENTS TO ANY USER 
To protect PL/SQL objects is necessary to disable DDL statements like create, replace and some 
DML statements oriented to the static data dictionary views *_SOURCE. To prevent execution 
of any DML/DDL statements on some object we must monitor every user session and analyze 
every SQL statements before their execution. 
We developed some scripts which can prevent any unauthorized user to execute DML/DDL 
statements over any database object. Those scripts monitor every user sessions and if they detect 
any DML/DDL statements over objects, which are protected by scripts, then scripts 
immediately, kill this user session and do not allow execution of those DML statements. 
The scripts also analyze DDL statements, because if a user with permission to disable triggers, 
to drop package, to modify procedure, functions, and etc, can disable our scripts too. By 
analyzing DDL statements, scripts can protect their self from any unauthorized DDL statements. 
So if a user is trying to execute DDL statements over our scripts, this session will be killed 
immediately [9]. 
All the DML and DDL statements are checked, and if statement is not allowed to be executed, 
immediately their session will be killed [9]. 
The package of those scripts also contains some tables and procedures. 
Table 1.  The package’s objects. 
Object name Type Description 
set_security Procedure This procedure enables and 
disables protection. Procedure 
password is required. 
set_password Procedure This procedure change password. 
Old and new password a required. 
reset_password Procedure This procedure sends an email to 
security officer with new 
password. 
add_object Procedure This procedure defines a new 
object to be protected. Object 
owner, object type and object 
name are required. 
remove_object Procedure This procedure removes an object 
from protection list. Object 
owner, object type and object 
name are required. 
grant_permission Procedure This procedure grants permission 
on a protected object to a 
database user. Object owner, 
object type and object name, and 
user name are required. Start date, 
end date, start hour and end hour 
are optional. 
revoke_permission Procedure This procedure revokes 
permission a database user. 
Object owner, object type and 
object name, and user name are 
required. 
exp_killed_session Table This procedure exports all killed 
sessions. Start date and end date 
are optional. 
security_object Table This table contains information 
about objects which will be 
protected 
user_permission Table This table contains information 
about users which have 
permission over protected objects 
p_config Table This table contains information 
about configuration, password, 
etc. data are encrypted 
killed_sessions Table This table contains information 
about killed sessions 
ddl_log Table This table contains information 
about every DDL statement 
executed by any database user 
 
5 CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK 
Our scripts can disable DML/DDL statements of an unauthorized user even he has DBA role, 
but we must monitor all sessions, so the database performance decrease but it does not influence 
too much. Our tests were based on a database schema which includes about 300 tables and some 
table contains more 50,000,000 million records. After the test we did not find a difference on a 
query time before the implementation of scripts and after it. 
As described above we can stop execution of DDL statements oriented to the static data 
dictionary views *_SOURCE, but this prevent DBA to access its PL/SQL objects, to solve this 
problem session monitoring part will allow query when their results do not contain any part 
from of protected PL/SQL objects. This part must be modified in future to allow execution of 
DML statements oriented to the static data dictionary views *_SOURCE but have to modify the 
result where protected objects will be invisible to user request. 
Even if DBA cannot execute DML/DDL statements on protected objects or DDL statements 
over our package he still can manipulate the data by generating some triggers to an authorized 
user. To eliminate this problem we insert every DDL statements into ddl_log table which is part 
of our package. 
Package must be installed to a user with sysdba role because it uses some necessary packages. 
During protection of objects, the scripts kill untrusted sessions but sometime not all the SQL 
statements on those sessions must be killed.  
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